Creating a New Mathematics by Gare, Arran
In this chapter, my focus is on efforts to create a new mathematics, with my prime interest being the role of mathematics in comprehending 
a world consisting first and foremost of processes, and examining what 
developments in mathematics are required for this. I am particularly 
interested in developments in mathematics able to do justice to the 
reality of life. Such mathematics could provide the basis for advancing 
ecology, human ecology and ecological economics and thereby assist in 
the transformation of society and civilization so that we augment life 
rather than undermining the conditions for our existence. It was in the 
process of grappling with these problems that I was drawn to investigate 
the tradition of intuitionism in mathematics and the role of intuition in 
mathematics, science and philosophy, and then to consider Whitehead’s 
work on mathematics and its philosophy in relation to these. 
This is part of a broader project. As I see it, the defense of process 
philosophy is a struggle against the nihilism of European civilization, 
brought about, as Nietzsche argued, by the will to power turned against 
itself. While it is usual to interpret this in relation to Christian morality, 
it is clear from Nietzsche’s Philosophical Notebooks that it was the trans-
mogrification of this morality into the quest for scientific truth that 
most concerned him. It is this quest for truth that has led to the denial 
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of reality to creative processes and life, since the reality of these stands 
in the way of comprehending the world as transparent to reason and 
thereby, predictable and controllable. As Nietzsche noted, ‘To impose 
upon becoming the character of being - that is the supreme will to pow-
er.’1 Nietzsche characterized this as ‘Egyptianism’. As Nietzsche wrote of 
philosophers in Twilight of the Idols:
There is ... their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their 
Egyptianism. They think they are doing a thing honour when 
they dehistoricise it, sub specie aeterni - when they make a 
mummy of it. All that philosophers have handled for millenia 
has been conceptual mummies; nothing actual has escaped their 
hands alive. They kill, they stuff, when they worship, these con-
ceptual idolaters - they become a mortal danger to everything 
when they worship. Death, change, age, as well as procreation 
and growth, are for them objections - refutations even. What is, 
does not become; what becomes is not ... Now they all believe, 
even to the point of despair, in that which is.2
Nothing has contributed more to and is more closely associated with 
this Egyptianism than mathematics. Writing of the illusions associated 
with claims to truth associated with science, Nietzsche argued that lan-
guage works to construct concepts. The outcome of this labour is that 
‘the great edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity of a Roman 
columbarium3 and exhales in logic that strength and coolness which is 
characteristic of mathematics.’4 Pythagoras, embracing the principle of 
sufficient reason that underpinned Anaximander’s cosmology, that there 
1   Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufman and R.J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968, §617), 330.
2   Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1889/1968), 35. 
3   A columbarium is a vault with niches for funeral urns containing the ashes 
of cremated bodies.
4   Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: Selections form Nietzsche’s Notebooks 
of the Early 1870’s, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979), 
85.
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must be a reason why things are the way they are and not otherwise, 
paved the way for Parmenides to deny the reality of change. The drive 
to understand the world entirely through mathematics, combined with 
the principle of sufficient reason, cannot allow for real creativity and the 
reality of life. All this was clearly evident in Descartes’ mathematics and 
philosophy. The drive to power is now disguised, but it is evident in the 
dominant quest by physicists to impose on becoming the character of 
being. The same will to power is implicit. 
Many philosophers and mathematicians appreciated where science 
was leading. It was his appreciation of the nihilistic implications of 
Newton’s mathematical physics that led Kant to argue that the world 
understood through mathematics is only the world of appearances, not 
the noumenal world. Kant characterized mathematics as a construction 
by subjects, developing this conception of mathematics to highlight 
the paradox of taking the objective world as portrayed by mathematical 
physicists, the world that appears to have no place for subjects, as the real 
world. That is, constructivism was developed by Kant to circumscribe 
and delimit the claims to validity of science. Many philosophers and 
mathematicians have supported this argument, or some variation of it, 
most notably, neo-Kantians and phenomenologists. Others opposed it. 
David Hilbert promoted formalism, while Gottlob Frege and Bertrand 
Russell argued that mathematics should be reduced to logic and defended 
a purely objectivist semantics that had no place for subjects. Opposing 
Hilbert and Frege, Luitzen Brouwer, who was influenced by Nietzsche 
through his teacher, Gerrit Mannoury, defended the role of intuition 
in mathematics. In doing so, he was not simply defending a particular 
philosophy of mathematics; he was taking a stand against nihilism, as is 
evident from his early work, Life, Art and Mysticism, published in 1905.5 
Brouwer’s intuitionism was another name for constructivism, and was 
really a development of a tradition of thought on mathematics that had 
begun with Kant’s account of and defence of constructivism. As such, 
intuitionism was also defended by Henri Poincaré and Hermann Weyl, 
and to some extent by Edmund Husserl, in each case reacting at least in 
5   Luitzen Ergbertus Jan Brouwer, "Life, Art and Mysticism," trans. Walter P. 
Van Stigt, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37.3 (1996): 391-429.
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part to the nihilism of mathematical physics. My claim is that as a pro-
cess philosopher concerned to overcome the nihilism of scientific mate-
rialism, Whitehead had more affinity with these intuitionists than with 
Frege and Russell, and examining the ideas that influenced him reveals 
more evidence to justify this view, although these also show the notions 
of construction and intuition were understood differently. They are more 
akin to the ideas of C.S. Peirce, and are best seen in conjunction with 
Peirce’s philosophy. With this historical background, it should become 
clearer what characterizations of and developments within mathematics 
are required to further advance Whitehead’s project. 
Whitehead (and Peirce) in historical context: Whitehead 
and Grassmann
Neither Whitehead nor Peirce originally took as their aim to develop 
philosophies that would overcome the Parmenidean tradition. They 
were predisposed to do so, however, because each had been exposed to 
the values that developed in reaction to the nihilism of the mechanis-
tic world-view. This reaction began in Britain and France, but reached 
its high point in Germany towards the end of the Eighteenth and the 
beginning of the Nineteenth Centuries, with Kant’s philosophy being 
a major source of inspiration for this reaction. Whitehead was exposed 
to these values through Romantic poetry and the work of the British 
Idealists. Peirce was exposed to this German influence through the study 
of Kant himself and through the Concord transcendentalists. However, 
these values were hardly central to their interests when they began their 
intellectual careers. There was another source connected to this German 
philosophical movement, however, a tradition within science and math-
ematics that, while being inspired by Kant, was much more radical and 
sought to overcome the whole tradition of Newtonian science. In the 
case of Whitehead, the crucial figure was the mathematician Hermann 
Grassmann, although William Hamilton’s mathematics and James Clerk 
Maxwell’s physics were also important. The significance of Whitehead’s 
alignment with these thinkers was not fully appreciated by Whitehead 
or most of his interpreters. What we see in Whitehead is a tension 
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between the influences on him of different traditions of thought, and it 
is through the working out of this tension in favor of German influences 
that Whitehead developed as a process philosopher. And in doing so, 
he exposed with great clarity the flawed assumptions of the dominant 
traditions of thought.
The tension in Whitehead’s philosophy can be found in the ‘Preface’ 
to his first published work, A Treatise on Universal Algebra.  Here he 
defines mathematics ‘in its widest signification’ as ‘the development of 
all types of formal, necessary, deductive reasoning. … The reasoning is 
formal in the sense that the meaning of a proposition forms no part of 
the investigation. … Mathematical reasoning is deductive in the sense 
that it is based upon definitions which, so far as the validity of the 
reasoning is concerned (apart from any existential import), need only 
the test of self-consistency.’6 Although there is a hint of Whitehead’s 
theory of abstraction when he characterizes a ‘mathematical definition 
with an existential import’ as ‘the result of an act of pure abstraction’,7 
there is nothing here inconsistent with a logical empiricist’s understand-
ing of mathematics, and the construal of mathematics as a system of 
tautologies. It foreshadows his later effort with Russell to reduce all 
mathematics to logic, following Frege in this regard. This involved an 
allegiance to logicism as a distinct philosophy of mathematics defined 
through its opposition to Hilbert’s formalism and to Platonism, but 
more fundamentally, to the intuitionism of Brouwer, Poincaré and Weyl. 
Frege, following Bernard Bolzano and Herman Lotze, rejected Kant’s 
constructivism and its implications, and was concerned to eliminate any 
role for mental processes, whether ideas, images, imaginative projec-
tions, constructions or intuitions. As opponents of intuitionism, Russell 
denied the significance accorded by Kant to synthesis in perception and 
thought, and rejected Kant’s claim that arithmetic is a synthetic a priori 
form of knowledge. 
However, Whitehead also characterized A Treatise on Universal 
Algebra as an exhibition of ‘the algebras both as systems of symbolism, 
and also as engines for the investigation of the possibilities of thought 
6   UA vi
7   UA vii
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and reasoning connected with the abstract general idea of space’ pro-
viding ‘[a] natural mode of comparison between the algebras … by the 
unity of subject-matters of their interpretation’ concerned to provide a 
‘detailed comparison of their symbolic structures’.8 Whitehead acknowl-
edged the source of these ideas in the work of Benjamin Peirce, C.S. 
Peirce’s father. Both Benjamin and Charles Peirce characterized math-
ematics as ‘the science that draws necessary conclusions’ and regarded 
mathematics as useful for studying logic, supporting Boole’s and de 
Morgan’s conception of symbolic logic as ‘an algebra of logic’ in oppo-
sition to Frege’s effort, followed by Russell and Whitehead, to reduce 
mathematics to logic understood as a universal language. Charles Peirce, 
together with his father, had made a thorough study of Kant, and later 
of Friedrich Schelling, who had embraced and further developed Kant’s 
constuctivism. Peirce characterized himself in a letter to William James 
as a ‘Schellingian of some stripe’.9 Charles Peirce went on to character-
ize mathematics through semiosis as ‘diagrammatic reasoning’, treating 
mathematics as a system of indexical signs the study of which could yield 
new knowledge. This was a development of Kant’s constructivist view of 
mathematics, not a rejection of it, and gave a central place to intuition 
associated with observation of diagrams.
After having acknowledged Peirce, Whitehead wrote that ‘[t]he 
greatness of my obligation in this volume to Grassmann will be under-
stood by those who have mastered his two Ausdehnungslehres. The 
technical development of the subject is inspired chiefly by his work of 
1862, but the underlying ideas follow the work of 1844.’10 Whitehead 
is unlikely to have been aware of it, but Hermann Grassmann was devel-
oping a conception of mathematics advanced by his father, Justus, under 
the influence of Schleiermacher and Schelling. These philosophers were 
influenced by Kant, but radicalized and generalized Kant’s notion of 
construction and his ideas on life developed in the Critique of Judgment. 
As Michael Otte argued, ‘J. Grassmann defines mathematics in the spirit 
8 UA v
9  C.S. Peirce, Collected Paper (8 vols), ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss and 
A. W. Burks (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1931-1966), 6.605. 
10 UA x
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of Schelling, not Kant, as pure constructivity.’11 The Grassmanns’ work 
was part of, and a further development of, the quest to develop a flowing, 
dynamic mathematics to overcome the Newtonian mechanistic view of 
the world. Justus Grassmann attempted to develop what he thought of 
as a ‘fluid geometry’, that is, a ‘dynamist, morphogenetic mathematics’ 
that would facilitate insight into the emergence and inner synthesis of 
patterns in nature.12 It was crucial that this mathematics not be limited 
to a theory of quantity and be independent of all relations of quantity 
so that it could go beyond the extrinsic, mechanical behavior of matter 
and recognize the intrinsic possibilities within nature for structuring and 
organizing. Hermann Grassmann’s work, which he characterized as the 
‘theory of extension’, continued this project. 
Grassmann presented this work as a survey of a general theory of 
forms, assuming, as he put it, ‘only the general concepts of equality and 
difference, conjunction and separation.’13  He argued that there are two 
branches in mathematics, 
the continuous form or magnitude [which] separates into the 
algebraic continuous form or intensive magnitude and the com-
binatorial continuous form of extensive magnitude. The intensive 
magnitude is thus that arising through generation of equals, the 
extensive magnitude or extension that arising through generation 
of the different.14 
Grassmann claimed that this second branch was previously 
unknown, but it is this branch that provides the foundations for all 
11 Michael Otte, "Justus and Hermann Grassmann: philosophy and mathe-
matics," in Hermann Grassmann: From Past to Future: Grassmann’s Work in Context, 
Hans-Joachim Petsche, 61-70 (Basel: Springer, 2011), 67.
12 Marie-Luise Heuser, "The Significance of Naturphilosophie for Justus and 
Hermann Grassmann," in Hermann Grassmann: From Past to Future: Grassmann’s Work 
in Context, edited by Hans-Joachim Petsche, 49-59 (Basel: Springer, 2011), 58.
13 Hermann Grassmann, A New Branch of Mathematics: The “Ausdehnungslehre” 
of 1844 and Other Works, trans. Lloyd C. Kannenberg (Peterborough, NH: Open Court, 
1995), 33.
14 Hermann Grassmann, Extension Theory, trans. Lloyd C. Kannenberg 
(American Mathematical Society, 1862/2000), 27.
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mathematics. As he characterized the aim of his 1844 version of his 
extension theory in his 1862 reworking of this, it 
extends and intellectualizes the sensual intuitions of geometry 
into general, logical concepts, and, with regard to abstract gen-
erality, is not simply one among other branches of mathematics, 
such as algebra, combination theory, and function theory, but 
rather far surpasses them in that all fundamental elements are 
unified under this branch, which thus as it were forms the key-
stone of the entire structure of mathematics.15 
In relation to this, it is significant that William Lawvere, one of the 
major figures involved in the development of category theory, argued 
that Grassmann’s work was a precursor to category theory.16 
Extended magnitude was defined by Grassmann as the magnitude 
created by the generation of difference in which the elements separate 
and become fixed as separate. This was understood dynamically, as is 
evident in Grassmann’s exposition of the concept of extension theory:
Continuous becoming analysed into its parts, appears as a con-
tinuous production with retention of that which has already 
become. With the extensive form, that which is newly produced 
is always defined as different; if, during this process, we no 
longer always retain what has already become, then we arrive at 
the concept of continuous evolution. We call that which under-
goes this evolution the generating element, and the generating 
element, in any of the states it assumes in its evolution, an ele-
ment of the continuous form. Accordingly, the extensive form is 
the collection of all elements into which the generating element 
is transformed by continuous evolution.17
15  Ibid., p.xiii.
16  F. William Lawvere, F. William, "Grassmann’s Dialectics and Category 
Theory," in Hermann Günther Grassmann (1809-1877): Visionary Mathematician, 
Scientist and Neohumanist Scholar, edited by Gert Shubring, 255-264 (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1996), 256.
17  Ibid., p.28f.
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Grassmann was concerned to apply this mathematics, and did so to 
the study of tides and to electrodynamics. In the tradition of Schellingian 
thought, the dynamic nature of construction in mathematics was meant 
to provide insight into the self-construction of nature.
Whitehead’s work, insofar as it was influenced by Frege, was antitheti-
cal to the Schellingian tradition and supported the development of logical 
empiricism, a philosophy that cemented in place mainstream reductionist 
science and rendered any knowledge, apart from how to control the world, 
as almost unintelligible. However, Whitehead became increasingly dissatis-
fied with the whole project of Principia Mathematica, at least as this project 
had been understood by Russell. Whitehead saw logic as a means for 
clarifying mathematical reasoning and exposing defective arguments, but 
acknowledged that ‘deductive logic has not the coercive supremacy which 
is conventionally conceded to it. When applied to concrete instances, it is a 
tentative procedure, finally to be judged by the self-evidence of its issues.’18 
In a late paper, he concluded that ‘Logic, conceived as an adequate analysis 
of the advance of thought, is a fake.’19 However, the more fundamental 
issue was that Whitehead’s whole orientation was different from Russell’s. 
While to use Leibnizian terminology, Russell, like Frege, was striving to 
develop a Lingua Universalis – a universal medium whose symbolic struc-
ture would reflect directly the structure of the world, Whitehead was con-
cerned to create a Calculus Ratiocinator, a method of symbolic calculation 
which would mirror and refine the processes of human reasoning.20 
Whitehead’s rejection of the project to reduce mathematics to logic 
and the development of his mature philosophy, and along with it, a dif-
ferent conception of mathematics, was really a development of the early 
influence of the Schellingian tradition and a creative contribution to con-
structivist thought. Instead of reducing mathematics to logic, Whitehead 
argued in Modes of Thought that ‘Mathematics is the most powerful 
technique for the understanding of pattern, and for the analysis of the 
18  MT 106
19  ESP 96
20 These different orientations have been identified by Jaakko Hintikka in Lingua 
Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996). 
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relationships of pattern.’21 When we say ‘twice three is six’, Whitehead 
proclaimed, ‘we are not saying that these two sides of the equation mean 
the same thing, but that two threes is a fluent process which become six 
as a completed pattern.’ So, for Whitehead, ‘mathematics is concerned 
with certain forms of process issuing into forms which are components 
for further process.’22 Aligned with Schelling, Charles Peirce’s characteri-
zation of mathematics was also a development within this tradition, and 
a further advance of it. Combining Whitehead’s and Peirce’s conceptions 
of mathematics, we can characterize mathematics as diagrammatical 
reasoning, studying iconic signs as a way of studying patterns and their 
transformations, including the patterns of reasoning, and in terms of 
such patterns and transformations, the relationship between the different 
branches of mathematics. Diagramatic reasoning is really a form of intu-
ition achieved through the construction and transformation of diagrams. 
Conceived of in this way, Whitehead’s Universal Algebra can itself be seen 
not only as a form of constructivism giving a central place to intuition 
and understanding, but as a further precursor to category theory.
robert rosen and cateGory theory  
It is through category theory that this conception of mathematics can 
be further developed. Category theory was characterized by one of its 
proponents as ‘a powerful language to develop a universal semantics of 
mathematical structures.’23 The concept of structures is problematic, 
but Saunders Mac Lane, one of the founders of category theory, char-
acterized mathematics as ‘not so much about things (objects) as about 
form (patterns or structures)’, virtually equating forms, structures and 
patterns. Structures are ‘lists of operations and their required properties, 
commonly given as axioms, and often so formulated as to be properties, 
shared by a number of possibly quite different specific mathematical 
21 ESP 109
22 MT 92 
23 Andrée C. Ehresmann, and Jean-Paul Vanbremeersch, Memory Evolutive 
Systems: Hierarchy, Emergence, Cognition (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), 26.
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objects.’24 Category theory enables us to see the universal components of 
a family of structures of a given kind, how structures of different kinds 
are interrelated, and to examine the mutability and admissible trans-
formations of precisely defined structures. A category has been defined 
as ‘a composite item consisting of a graph and an internal law which 
associates an arrow of the graph to each path of the graph, called its 
composite, and which satisfies some axioms given further on.’25 Category 
theory began with the observation that many properties of mathematical 
systems can be unified and simplified through a presentation with a dia-
gram of arrows between ‘objects’ (which can be sets, groups or rings, or 
can be unspecified), where each arrow represents a function. The most 
important property of these arrows is that they can be ‘composed’, that 
is, arranged in a sequence to form a new arrow. The focus is then not 
on ‘objects’, but on the structure preserving mappings or ‘morphisms’ 
between these ‘objects’.26 These mappings, which reveal the possible 
transformations of structures, can themselves be studied in this way. If 
the structures are themselves categories so that the morphisms revealing 
possible transformations are between categories, these are referred to as 
‘functors’, and are represented as arrows between the categories. There 
can also be a category of functors. The morphisms that transform one 
functor into another while respecting the internal structure of the cate-
gories involved, thereby bringing into focus their mutability, are ‘natural 
transformations’.
Rosen’s conception of mathematics, and its relation to science, is 
based on his development of category theory as a general theory of 
modeling. He argued that in fact most mathematics has some referent 
to something external to the formalism itself, and so is ‘applied’ math-
ematics, with modeling being the judicious association of a formalism 
24 Saunders Mac Lane, "Structures in Mathematics," Philosophia Mathematica 
4.3 (1996): 174-183, 174.
25 Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch, Memory Evolutive Systems, 25f.
26 Robert Rosen, Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin, and 
Fabrication of Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 143ff.
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with such external referents.27 However, category theory makes explicit 
and clarifies the nature of this modeling relation. Rosen characterized 
categories as formal systems, morphisms as entailment structures, and 
natural transformations as explicit modeling of one system by another.28 
He then argued that from material systems we can abstract out ‘natural 
systems’ which can be modeled in the same way as formal systems are 
modeled. Modeling natural systems in this way is really hypothesizing 
via abstractions about their elements and entailment structures to estab-
lish congruence between formal systems and these natural systems. This 
involves carefully delineating observables and linkage relations of the 
natural systems. There can be no mechanical algorithm for doing this, 
it is inescapably an art. Once this congruence has been established suc-
cessfully, we can learn about the modeled system by studying the model 
of it. This involves using encoding and decoding arrows, along with 
‘dictionaries’ to translate back and forth between the two systems, with 
measurement being a form of encoding, and tracing causal entailments 
being a form of decoding. 
Examining the variety of entailment structures, Rosen argued that 
modern science, under the influence of Newton, has excluded the kinds 
of observations, relations and models with complex forms of entailments 
that are characteristic of living organisms. Rosen’s main concern was to 
develop mathematics and to reconceive the goal of science to do justice 
to the reality of life itself. This involved advancing the tradition of nat-
ural philosophy inspired by Kant’s Critique of Judgment and the work of 
Schelling. Category theory as conceived by Rosen can be interpreted as a 
major development of the Whiteheadian/Peircian conception of math-
ematics - as the study through abstraction of possible patterns of con-
nectedness and their transformations utilizing iconic signs or diagrams.29 
Based on this way of understanding mathematics, Rosen argued 
that Gödel’s theorem is just another foundation crisis for mathematics 
27 Robert Rosen, Essays on Life Itself  (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000), 359.
28 Rosen, Life Itself, 147.
29 Zalamea, Fernando, Synthetic Philosophy of Contemporary Mathematics (New 
York: Sequence Press, 2012), 219ff.
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due to it having taken a fateful wrong turn with Pythagoras. Pythagoras 
had attempted to reduce geometry to arithmetic, equating effectiveness 
with an iteration procedure such as counting; that is, computation. 
It was this assumption that led to Zeno’s paradoxes and the crippling 
of mathematics for millennia. The basic problem is assuming that the 
simple procedures adequate to simple domains of mathematics, which 
are adequate for modeling very limited domains of reality, are adequate 
to more complex domains and can define acceptable procedures. This 
underpins the quest for formalization, and over and over again, it has 
failed. More recent efforts in this direction involved efforts to eliminate 
semantics from mathematics and to reduce mathematics to syntactical 
operations without any outside reference. Rosen noted the consequence 
of this: ‘once inside such a universe … we cannot get out again, because 
all the original external referents have presumably been pulled inside 
with us. … Once inside, we can claim “objectivity”; we can claim inde-
pendence from any external context, because there is no external context 
anymore.’30  
Most mathematics is not formalizable through axioms as Hilbert 
called for. For Rosen, what Gödel showed was that the model of arith-
metic, developed by Frege, Russell and Whitehead using set theory and 
logic, is less rich than arithmetic. Arithmetic is ‘soft science’ relative to 
the ‘hard science’ of set theory and logic, just as arithmetic is less rich 
than what is modeled by it, the richness of which is better captured by 
the ‘soft’ disciplines of the humanities and by the arts.31 With modeling, 
this will always be the case. The modeling relation, where something is 
learned about one system by studying another which is analogous to 
it, is ubiquitous and characteristic of everyday life as well as of both 
theoretical and experimental science.32 It is the failure to appreciate this 
that has led to the belief that objectivity implies the reduction of biology 
to chemistry and physics. As Rosen diagnosed source of this problem:
30 Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 77.
31 Rosen, Life Itself, 9f.
32 Robert Rosen, Anticipatory Systems: Philosophical, Mathematical, and 
Methodological Foundations (New York: Springer, 1985/2012), 82.
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[T]hese ideas [that every model of a material process must be 
formalizable] have become confused with objectivity and hence 
with the very fabric of the scientific enterprise. Objectivity is 
supposed to mean observer independence, and more generally, 
context independence. Over the course of time this has come to 
mean only building from the smaller to the larger, and reducing 
the larger to the smaller. … In any large world, such as the one 
we inhabit, this kind of identification is in fact a mutilation, 
and it serves only to estrange most of what is interesting from 
the realm of science itself.33 
Once this is realized, we can not only free ourselves from the spell 
of the Pythagorean/Parmenidean ideal of science, reveal further aspects 
of its incoherence and free science to acknowledge the reality of life 
and mind, but develop mathematics more adequate to life. We can 
also recognize the limits of mathematics and the role and validity of 
non-mathematical conceptualizations and models that acknowledge 
some measure of indeterminacy in the present and openness to the 
future. Rosen showed the real issue and the real problem to be how to 
develop a mathematical structure in which the logical entailments within 
the mathematical models adequately reflect the causal entailments in 
that which is being investigated. In biology, what is being investigated 
are living beings. Rather than invoke an inadequate surrogate universe, 
it is necessary to appreciate the full reality of life itself characterized by 
final causes and functionality of components.34 Functional components 
cannot be fractionated and treated independently of the organism since 
they are aspects of and definable only through the whole organism. 
Recognizing a place for final causes, Rosen set out to model antici-
patory systems, systems which do not simply respond to their environ-
ments but anticipate and respond to what will happen in the future.35 
That physics at present has no place for the influence of future condi-
tions and final causes indicates, Rosen argued, that it is too specific and 
33 Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 80.
34 Rosen, Life Itself, 108ff.
35 See Robert Rosen, Anticipatory Systems.
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conceptually limited, just as nineteenth century physics was too specific 
and conceptually limited to account for atomic spectra, radioactivity 
and chemical bonding. Just as to explain these required the conceptual 
revolutions of relativity theory and quantum theory, so a new conceptual 
revolution is required. Rosen questioned the primacy given to closed 
systems in science, arguing that open systems are generic, and a closed 
system is an extremely degenerate case of an open system. Along with 
this, he also questioned the notion of ‘state’ in science and reality, sug-
gesting that it is a fiction. The conceptual revolution required to account 
for life will also require a new mathematics. The mathematics of Oliver 
Heaviside and Paul Dirac gave a place to discontinuous signals (the 
δ-function), which were initially discounted or denigrated (by John von 
Neumann among others) as not genuine mathematics. Nevertheless, 
they eventually had to be accepted and the old mathematics relegated 
to the status of a special case. Similarly, new mathematics will have to 
be developed that will relegate the old mathematics to the status of a 
special case.36 This is what Rosen set out to do. 
Modeling anticipatory systems involves modeling systems that pro-
duce their own components (in accordance with how Kant and Schelling 
understood living organisms). To do this, they require models of them-
selves (as von Neumann argued). Such systems, Rosen showed, can be 
represented through synthetic models in which functional components 
are the direct product of the system. In these models the components are 
context dependent, and cannot be reduced to fractional parts conceiv-
able independently of the models. Such systems are complex, but not 
as mainstream complexity theory understands complexity. This theory, 
Rosen claimed, had not freed itself from Newtonian assumptions and 
dealt only with the complicated. Genuine complexity requires multiple 
formal descriptions which are not derivable from each other, to capture 
all their properties. The example Rosen produced to illustrate this was 
his metabolism, repair, reproduction models (the M-R systems). These 
models consist of three algebraic maps, one of which represents the 
efficient cause of metabolism in a cell, another, the efficient cause of 
36 Rosen, Life Itself, 28ff.
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repair (that repairs damage to the metabolic processes), and the third 
represents replication which repairs damage to the repair process.37 Each 
of these maps has one of the other two as a member of its co-domain, 
and is itself a member of the co-domain of the remaining map. The maps 
thus form a loop of mutual containment. As Rosen put it: ‘a material 
system is an organism if, and only if, it is closed to efficient causation. That 
is, if ƒ is any component of such a system, the question “why ƒ” has an 
answer within the system, which corresponds to the category of efficient 
cause of ƒ.’38 On the basis of such models it is possible to appreciate 
the ability of complex systems to incorporate models of themselves in 
their environments into their behaviour, anticipating future events and 
correcting their behaviour as new information sheds light on the antic-
ipatory process.39 
creatinG a neW mathematics
Rosen’s work has freed mathematicians from Newtonian assumptions 
to explore the possibilities opened up by category theory. He has been 
a source of inspiration for an increasing number of mathematicians and 
theorists, beginning with his students. A.H. Louie, the most prominent 
of his students, subsequently published More Than Life Itself: A Synthetic 
Continuation in Relational Biology, and The Reflection of Life: Functional 
Entailment and Imminence in Relational Biology.40 However, Rosen and 
his students are not the only mathematicians who have embraced this 
project of using category theory, and in doing so, have transcended 
Newtonian assumptions to develop a process relational view of reality. 
Andrée Ehresmann and Jean-Paul Vanbremeersch in Memory Evolutive 
Systems began by noting that while it is necessary for humans to dis-
tinguish objects and their relations, we should not allow ourselves to 
37 Ibid., 248ff.
38 Ibid., 244.
39 Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 199.
40 A.H. Louie, More Than Life Itself: A Synthetic Continuation in Relational 
Biology (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2009) and The Reflection of Life: Functional Entailment 
and Imminence in Relational Biology (Berlin: Springer, 2013).
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be dominated by the very limited notion of objects as physical objects 
located in space; these should include ‘a musical tone, an odour or an 
internal feeling. The word phenomenon (used by Kant, 1790) or event 
(in the terminology of Whitehead, 1925) would perhaps be more appro-
priate.’41 An ‘object’ can be a body, property, event, process, conception, 
perception or sensation, and it is also necessary to take into account 
more or less temporary relations between such objects. As Ehresman and 
Vanbremeersch put it: ‘Long ago, the Taoists imagined the universe as a 
dynamic web of relations, whose events constitute the nodes; each action 
of a living creature modifies its relations with its environment, and the 
consequences gradually propagate to the whole of the universe.’42 They 
argued that while Rosen recognized the potential of category theory, he 
did not fully develop it. They suggest that the role of categories in Rosen’s 
models of metabolism and repair and of organismic systems are often 
purely descriptive, and do not exploit the deep results of category theory. 
They claim that in their model, ‘we make use of fundamental construc-
tions, to give an internal analysis of the structure of the dynamics of 
the system.’43 They then described their efforts to characterize this in a 
mathematical model in which ‘the successive configurations of a system, 
as defined by its components and the relations among them around a 
given time, will be represented by categories; the changes among config-
urations by functors. The evolution of the system will mostly depend on 
the interactions between agents at various levels of complexity, acting 
with different time scales.’44 Memory evolutive systems are multi-scale, 
multi-agent and multi-temporal and analyse changes, from an internal, 
or ‘endo’ perspective, through a net of internal agents acting as co-regu-
lators. Involving a family of categories indexed over time, these are able 
to model a complexification process internally selected by the net of 
co-regulators capable of creativity.45 
The work of Rosen and Ehresmann has stimulated further efforts 
41 Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch, Memory Evolutive Systems, 21.
42 Ibid., 33.
43 Ibid., 33.
44 Ibid., 21 & 22.
45 Ibid.
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to develop mathematics adequate to life, notably the non-reduction-
ist biomathematics, or ‘integral biomathics’, exemplified in Plamen 
Simeonov. Simeonov led the work to produce a major anthology 
on integral biomathics which he edited along with Leslie Smith and 
Andrée Ehresmann,46 and two special editions of Progress in Biophysics 
& Molecular Biology, the first which, published in 2013, he edited with 
Koichiro Matsuno and Robert Root-Bernstein,47 and the second with 
Steven Rosen and Arran Gare, published in 2015. 
conclusion
These developments in mathematics are based on fundamentally dif-
ferent conceptions of what mathematics is and of its role in science 
than those that led philosophers to deny the reality of change, creativity 
and life. Mathematics is no longer assumed to be about what is, and 
only then about transformations, or that it is first and foremost about 
objects, and only in terms of these, about relations. Also abandoned is 
the assumption that success in understanding any item in the world is 
achieved when a largest model can be found from which all other models 
applicable to it can be deduced, and therefore that the ultimate goal of 
science is to find the equations modeling the whole universe through 
which all other features of the universe can be deduced. Furthermore, 
the Pythagorean assumption that mathematics by itself is capable of 
modeling every aspect of nature is abandoned. With the new concep-
tion of mathematics, we can now view mathematics as playing a major 
part in comprehending a creative universe rather than explaining away 
the appearance of creativity. Since living beings are seen to have models 
of themselves in their environments and can be modeled as such, we 
can now see more clearly through mathematics, final causes and activ-
ities as transformations, and how mathematical patterns, or forms of 
46 Plamen L. Simeonov, Leslie L. Smith and Andrée C. Ehresmann, Integral 
Biomathics: Tracing the Road to Reality (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2012).
47 Simeonov, Plamen L., K. Matsuno and R.S. Root-Bernstein, "Can Biology 
Create a Profoundly New Mathematics and Computation?" Focussed Issue of Progress 
in Biophysics & Molecular Biology 113 (2013).
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definiteness, can ingress in nature. All this requires recognition of the 
place of synthesis in experience, in mathematical work, in developing 
models of processes, and in what is modeled through mathematics, and 
all such synthesis involves constructive intuition. This recognition should 
free mathematicians to advance further this work of creating a new 
mathematics.
